A surprising contact on LinkedIn. An offer of work from a recruiter, probably a young woman, operating from China. The opportunity to make perhaps £20,000 part-time writing a small number of political analyses for a Chinese company peppered with “non-public” or “insider” information. Compensation in cryptocurrency or cash preferred.
It may seem clear, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be suspicious. However, China’s powerful intelligence agency continues to view it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to attempt this – leading the domestic spy agency to issue multiple warnings about their activity online.
Massive Contact Attempts on Social Media
Last year, MI5 chief the agency's director said Chinese agents were approaching UK citizens on the platform on an unprecedented scale, at a rate of 10,000 over the previous 30-month period, attempting to obtain political, commercial, military and technological secrets. However a new initiative aimed at elected officials and parliament has prompted the spy agency to take further action.
A spying alert was distributed on Tuesday via the administrative teams of the Commons speaker and his Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and other operatives to reach out to Members of Parliament, peers, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.
Intelligence Strategy and Legislative Changes
In the curious style of British intelligence, there was no official release of the protective guidance from MI5 or the interior ministry. Yet the agency was aware its briefing note would leak once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Sharing it in the press helps the wider public more easily recognize communications with a deceptive intent.
The alert has the effect of uncovering more information from in and around parliament, although that is not MI5’s main objective. The agency aims for public figures to recognize that just because interactions on LinkedIn are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Additionally, the domestic spy agency understood to have been reacting to any specific incident in the legislature, although the recent actions occur after the awkward failure of the prosecution of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his associate Christopher Berry on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
The two had been accused of spying for the foreign power – a charge they denied – but failure to complete a prosecution under the since replaced previous legislation resulted in warnings that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Laws and China's Strategic Interests
Legislation has since been updated, and the security briefing includes a note of its replacement: “Those engaging in espionage activity face substantial criminal penalties under the National Security Act.” This constitutes a crime if a person participates in behavior that could potentially “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.
A natural question, however, is what China has to gain. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have restricted knowledge of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs even less. But the Chinese government is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a period, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or genocide was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
To a degree there are distinct approaches too. Authoritarian governments like Beijing's export information gathering techniques and the scale of its spy network is vast, engaging 300,000 people. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under president Joe Biden, said it was occasionally assessed that “China have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is prepared to cultivate people over the extended period and at times even the intelligence services have found it difficult to distinguish between legitimate relationships and espionage. “Beijing has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value,” the minister responsible Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the government situation may result in someone rapidly peripheral turning significant.
Another way to consider the continuous efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between China and the west at a threshold under the level of direct conflict. China has increased its cyber operations, with the one campaign infiltration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of millions connected equipment.
Chinese authorities is involved in persistent attempts to find covert sources on British democracy via digital means because it wants to be provocative, to demonstrate power and because it can.
